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Mark Claster Mamolen Professor of Law and Technology
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This chapter considers the changing roles and forms of information property within the
political economy of informational capitalism. I begin with an overview of the principal
methods used in law and in media and communications studies, respectively, to study
information property, considering both what each disciplinary cluster traditionally has
emphasized and newer, hybrid directions. Next, I develop a three-part framework for
analyzing information property as a set of emergent institutional formations that both
work to produce and are themselves produced by other evolving political-economic
arrangements. The framework considers patterns of change in existing legal institutions
for intellectual property, the ongoing dematerialization and datafication of both
traditional and new inputs to economic production, and the emerging logics of economic
organization within which information resources (and property rights) are mobilized.
Finally, I consider the implications of that framing for two very different contemporary
information property projects, one relating to data flows within platform-based business
models and the other to information commons.
1. Property’s Disciplinarities 1
Legal scholarship on information property traditionally has been concerned with
internal justifications and has relied for the most part on methods broadly associated with
liberal political theory. Models of intellectual property rights derived from neoclassical
economics and analytic philosophy have favored ideal, abstract forms organized around
considerations such as the presumptive connection between appropriation and productive
development (e.g., Landes & Posner 2003) or that between exclusive control and
minimization of information and transaction costs (e.g., Smith 2007). Models derived
from liberal political philosophy link exclusive control with protection of the creator’s
natural rights (e.g., Epstein 2011). (Although the above-cited works all favor maximalist
approaches to intellectual property protection, important work favoring more restrained
approaches also emanates from each of these methodological traditions. Some economic
theorists of intellectual property emphasize the positive spillovers that flow from limiting
rightholder control (e.g., Frischmann & Lemley 2007) and some political philosophers of
1

Here I am acutely conscious of having left many important works and scholars out. A full list would go on
for much longer; unfortunately, however, word limits prevent this chapter from doing so.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2991271

Cohen, Property and the Information Economy, v.2 (June 22, 17)| 2

intellectual property emphasize the liberty and speech interests of audiences and users
(e.g, Gordon 1993; Benkler 1999).) Meanwhile, like critical legal theorists more
generally, critical legal theorists of intellectual property have focused on deconstructing
legal categories to expose their arbitrariness and illuminate the relationships between
property and power (e.g., Boyle 1998; Jaszi 1994).
Investigations of information property by scholars who study media and
communications, meanwhile, traditionally have tended to focus on the social and cultural
effects of intellectual property regimes. Preferred methodologies span the social science
toolkit but tend to be infused with framing insights from critical social theory. For
example, media and communications scholars have explored the linkages between
copyright ownership of media content and hegemonic control of meaning (e.g., Bettig
1996). Other work on a diverse collection of intellectual property-related topics including
piracy, appropriation art, and other user-generated content draws on scholarly traditions
that emphasize reader recoding and resistance (e.g., Coombe 1998).
Each cluster of disciplinarities has contributed usefully to the study of information
property, but (as many of the above-cited authors themselves have ultimately concluded),
that project demands a hybrid methodological approach that includes institutionalist,
materialist, sociological and political economic lenses. Property arrangements are
socially embedded institutions that systematically structure the conditions of resource
access and use (Fennell 2013). Such institutions may assume a variety of configurations
(Cohen 2015), so although the property label packs an important rhetorical punch, it is
also important to pay attention to scope-defining rules and operational details. This point
leads directly into consideration of materiality. Although the very existence of intellectual
property protection makes plain that property does not simply reduce to materiality and
can exist without it (or, alternatively, that under the right conditions, the label “property”
can be deployed to reify intangibles), differences in materiality do correlate to systematic
differences in the design of property institutions for different resources (ibid.).
The material properties of digital objects and communications networks, however,
are highly configurable. Digital protocols have afforded new points of leverage for
coding in control of informational goods, thereby elevating physical control as a key
determinant of de facto propertization (Lessig 1998; Gillespie 2007). Both for this reason
and because the material configurations of media artifacts and infrastructures have a
range of other (anticipated and unanticipated) affordances (Boczkowski & Siles 2014;
Lievrouw 2014), materiality must be reckoned with as an important factor shaping both
user experiences and societal implications more generally.
Other considerations affecting the design of intellectual property institutions are
sociological; institutions need to “work” within the communities that rely on them, and
institutions that work to the detriment of disempowered communities can create pressing
social justice problems. A diverse collection of scholars has begun to study these issues
from a variety of perspectives, exploring the ways that intellectual property law shapes
the experiences and behaviors of creators, firms, and others in an increasingly networked
and globalizing economy (e.g., Burk 2015; Chon 2006; Cohen 2012; Gray, Sandvoss, &
Harrington 2007; Schur 2009; Silbey 2015); and investigating movements for
information commons and the communities that support them (e.g., Benkler 2006;
Coleman 2013; Frischmann, et al. 2014; Kelty 2008).
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Lastly, property institutions are situated within evolving systems of political
economy, and both parts of that compound term are important to understanding how and
why particular institutions work as they do. To begin with, property institutions and the
constructs on which they rely reflect (perceived) imperatives flowing from prevailing
modes of economic development, production, and organization. In practice, property
constructs therefore often both reflect and elide considerations of power, simultaneously
entrenching various forms of privilege and masking them with just-so stories about
property, productivity and virtue. Property institutions also may express a wider range of
political values, however. So, for example, Joseph Singer (2011) observes that property is
a dominant modality of governance in democratic societies and that institutions
facilitating widely distributed home ownership, in particular, have been understood as
furthering democratic self-government. Bill Herman (2013) has charted the process by
which public interest coalitions became a permanent fixture within the copyright
legislative landscape.
Building on these observations about method and perspective, Part 2 explores
the evolving relationships between legal institutions for intellectual property and the
political economy of informational capitalism.
2. Institutionalizing Transformation: Intellectual Property and Evolving Political
Economy
One way to think about the relationship between information as property and the
emergence of the information economy might be in simple, syllogistic terms: Just as the
transition from agrarianism to industrialism appeared to demand the appropriation of
natural resources and the unbridled commodification of labor, land, and money
(Polanyi 1957), so the transition from industrialism to informationalism (Castells
1996; Schiller 2007) now appears to require the appropriation and commodification
of other important resources. The relationships between intellectual property institutions
and larger dynamics of economic and sociotechnical (re)organization are more complex
than that formulation suggests, however.
Among economic historians, a useful frame for understanding the emergence of
industrial capitalism has been Karl Polanyi’s (1957) analysis of a “great transformation”
in the system of political economy that involved large-scale appropriation of resources,
but that also moved on conceptual and organizational levels. The basic factors of
industrial production—labor, land, and money—were reconceptualized as commodities,
while at the same time patterns of barter and exchange became detached from local
communities and reembedded in the constructed mechanism of “the market.” It was these
developments that lent both momentum and legitimacy to the resource-directed activities
about which so much has been written—the large-scale enclosures of land, displacement
of populations, extraction of natural resources, and construction of factories. Together,
these appropriative, conceptual and organizational shifts produced a decisive movement
toward a capitalist political economy. Then, when the resulting dislocations become too
extreme, they prompted a countermovement aimed at ameliorating their effects.
Extending the analytical frame and the metaphor of the double movement, it is
useful to frame the emergence of informational capitalism in terms of three large-scale
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shifts that together constitute a movement toward informational capitalism: the
propertization (or enclosure) of intangible resources, the dematerialization of the basic
factors of industrial production, and the embedding of patterns of barter and exchange
within information platforms. Whether the effects of those changes will elicit a
meaningful countermovement is yet to be seen, and the topic of a book in progress
(Cohen, forthcoming), from which this chapter is adapted. Here, my purpose is simply to
explore the ways that forms of information property both work to produce and are
themselves produced by emerging economic arrangements.
a. Metamorphoses of “Intellectual Property”
This section traces the evolution of the major systems of intellectual property
protection over the course of the modern era, identifying three large trends. First, and
predictably, legal protection for patents, copyrights, and trademarks has grown stronger,
longer, and broader, while at the same time the justifications for granting protection have
come to refer more directly to the motivations and presumed needs of production
intermediaries and corporate brand owners. Second, the movement to an informational
economy has produced large structural and conceptual shifts in the ways that rightholders
understand, exploit and value patents, copyrights, and trademarks; in brief, intellectual
property rights have begun to behave in more uniform, predictable, and monetizable
ways—i.e., more like other components of corporate asset portfolios. Finally, the
increasing value and diversity of informational byproducts has begun to produce a more
diverse and differentiated landscape of intangible intellectual property entitlements.
From the beginning of the modern era, debates about patent and copyright policy
have concerned the relationships between individual creators and production
intermediaries—industrial firms on the patent side and publishers, motion picture
producers, and record labels on the copyright side. That focus reflected practical realities:
Although governments funded some large-scale scientific and technical research,
industrial firms with access to capital assembled the research teams and the material
resources needed to solve other kinds of large-scale technical problems and amassed the
capital needed to manufacture and distribute the resulting industrial and consumer
products. Similarly, before the advent of powerful desktop computing platforms put
professional-quality editing capabilities within easy reach, access to specialized
equipment was necessary to produce cultural goods in forms suitable for the mass market.
Some cultural production was publicly funded, but much was not. Additionally,
dissemination of creative outputs required access to printing presses, newsstands and
bookstores, movie theaters, or broadcast airwaves.
It is unsurprising, then, that the patent and copyright regimes that evolved during
the twentieth century were designed to facilitate industrial production and dissemination
of intangible goods. New treaties and statutes altered the scope of patents and copyrights
in ways that favored powerful new industries, giving patentable subject matter broad and
openended scope, redefining copyright to cover the byproducts of new recording,
broadcast, and computer technologies, and granting copyrights uniform and lengthy terms
(Litman 1987; Litman 2001; Merges 2000). Today, the patent and copyright regimes in
force in developed countries (and extended via the world trade system to developing and
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least developed countries) contain broad, general rights and narrow, specific limitations
that eliminate latitude for many nonprofit and downstream uses of copyrighted works and
patented inventions. Assignment of economic interests in intellectual property from
employees to employers is routine. (In the U.S. copyright system, corporate employers
own their employees’ creations from the outset.)
Twentieth-century debates about intellectual property policy also reveal a gradual
shift in the tenor of the prevailing justifications for granting patents and copyrights.
Although policy debates continued to refer to the motivations of individual creators, new
strands of justification began to emerge that emphasized the claims of intermediaries
more directly. In Continental European copyright debates, the rhetoric of individual
creatorship increasingly was deployed to justify control by intermediaries such as
performing rights organizations. In the U.S., whereas nineteenth-century instrumentalist
rhetoric had emphasized the public benefits to be gained from underwriting progress in
science and learning, the distinctive flavor of instrumentalism that developed over the
course of the twentieth century focused more narrowly on incentives to production. The
turn to incentives provided a point of entry for express consideration of the incentives of
the production intermediaries without which, as the argument went, many intangible
intellectual goods would not be produced and distributed at all (e.g., Landes & Posner
2003). Most recently, in disputes raising questions about harmonization with international
intellectual property developments, some courts and commentators have evinced a
willingness to abandon creator-centric rhetoric altogether, focusing instead on concerns
about the balance of power in international trade. 2
The changes to trademark law have been equally dramatic. Within the traditional
hierarchy of intellectual property rights that emerged over the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, trademarks were inferior rights that served principally to protect
against unfair diversion of trade, not to confer broad property entitlements operative
regardless of context (McKenna 2007). More recently, economic justifications for
trademark protection have emphasized signaling about consistent product quality. By the
early twentieth century, however, brands and branding had begun to assume very
different persuasive and performative functions. A prime mover in that shift was the
nascent marketing industry, which early on came to envision its role as that of identifying
desirable types of customers and devising more effective ways to reach them (Turow
1997). The shift to persuasion gathered velocity as mass media markets and technologies
evolved (ibid.; Ang 1991).
For consumers on the receiving end of contemporary marketing strategies, brands
and branding have come to function both as tools for self-articulation and as heuristics for
social sorting. Brands and branding underwrite complex systems of performative and
fundamentally social consumption, enabling consumers to signify class allegiance and to
draw conclusions about others’ allegiances and social status. Those systems reflect the
deliberate efforts of marketers who seem to have internalized the core tenets of

2
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poststructuralist thought about the cultural construction of identity and meaning (Holt
2004; McDonagh 2015).
As the expressive power of corporate brands assumed ever-increasing importance,
both the legal framework governing brand-related activities and the justifications for
affording protection have adapted in response, conferring on brand proprietors
increasingly broad protection over brand atmospherics (Beebe 2010; Tushnet 2015). So,
for example, although courts and commentators initially thought that trademarks
reproduced on logo merchandise served purely aesthetic purposes, mark owners
eventually convinced courts that most such reproductions signified sponsorship and
therefore required authorization. That result effectively sheltered an increasingly broad
web of licensing designed to encourage performative consumption and bolster brand
atmospherics. Although courts and commentators initially characterized infringement
lawsuits against down-market counterfeits as doctrinally and economically baseless, mark
owners eventually convinced courts to find infringement based on a theory of “post-sale
confusion,” or cognitive dissonance resulting from the mismatch between luxury signifier
and down-market context.
As intellectual property doctrine, theory, and rhetoric have evolved to emphasize
the primacy of corporate claims, deeper conceptual and structural changes also have been
underway. Although individual patents, copyrights, and trademarks remain the theoretical
basic units of protection, the industrial organization of cultural and technical production
increasingly emphasizes amassing intangible capital at scale (Benkler 2002; Desai 2012;
Parchomovsky & Wagner 2005). Portfolio-based intellectual property strategies in turn
have begun to reshape legal doctrines. So, for example, as character copyrights have
become cornerstones of merchandising campaigns, the test for character copyrightability
has become correspondingly more lenient. As patent portfolios have become more central
to competitive strategy in a variety of industries, courts have allowed claimants in certain
industries to draft key enabling disclosures broadly and vaguely, and firms also have
learned to practice selective disclosure in ways that both strengthen their own portfolio
positions and disadvantage their competitors. Legal protection for trade dress—originally
understood to mean specific packaging elements associated with a product or service—
now provides broad protection for the “look and feel” of products, services, and even
business establishments.
As important corporate assets increasingly have become informational in
character, perceived needs for methods of defining and valuing legal entitlements in
intangible intellectual goods have begun to reshape entire areas of law relating to such
matters as secured finance, securities regulation, and taxation. Each of those fields,
moreover, values certainty and predictability in asset definition, which in turn shapes the
behavior of firms that develop, use, and transact in intangibles in ways that also have
begun to reshape legal doctrines. So, for example, many disputes about consumeroriented exceptions and limitations to copyright have become disputes about the weight
to be given to norms and practices favoring licensing. Courts in patent validity disputes
have developed ancillary tests that emphasize commercial success as an indicator of
nonobviousness. Strict rules barring the licensing of trademarks without quality control
and prohibiting transfers of marks without the accompanying business goodwill have
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been relaxed, allowing complex webs of franchising, merchandising, and co-branding to
flourish.
A final important set of changes involves a blurring of intellectual property law’s
traditional taxonomies. As intangible intellectual goods have become more varied, more
important, and potentially more profitable, carefully delineated taxonomies of rights that
originated in an earlier era have come to seem increasingly inadequate. New types of
informational rights have mushroomed around the edges of existing entitlements:
prohibitions against trademark dilution and “cybersquatting” that bolster the economic
power of brand owners; regulatory entitlements that expand the window of exclusivity for
patented pharmaceutical and biomedical products facing competition from generics;
expanded rights in industrial design; and protections against “circumvention” of copyprotection technologies that effectively shield proprietary media platforms from
unauthorized access. Some intellectual property scholars have decried the loss of
conceptual purity, but from a different perspective these developments are entirely
predictable; confronted with claims of economic urgency, seemingly arbitrary doctrinal
obstacles have begun to melt away.
b. Labor, Land, and Money—and People—Reimagined
Two subjects conspicuously absent from the preceding section’s narrative of
expansion, reconceptualization, and augmentation of existing systems of intellectual
property protection are data and algorithms, both of which have proved powerfully
resistant to formal propertization. According to centuries-old intellectual property
formulations, facts and formulas are public property. Appearances can be deceptive,
however. As the movement to informational capitalism has gathered momentum, the
three inputs that Polanyi identified as the basic factors of production in a capitalist
political economy are undergoing a new process of transformation. The movement to an
industrial economy reconstructed labor, land, and money as commodities; the movement
to an informational economy is reconstructing labor, land, and money as dematerialized
inputs to new and highly informationalized modes of profit extraction—i.e., as data.
Additionally, data flows from the dematerialization of labor, land, and money have been
joined by a new and highly lucrative fourth factor of production: personal information
gathered from and about individuals and groups. Property formalism notwithstanding,
these datafied resources are the subjects of active appropriation strategies that represent
both economic and legal entrepreneurship.
As the movement to informational capitalism has gained velocity, finance has
become both increasingly detached from the real-world activities that it originally served
to enable and increasingly informationalized (Arrighi 1994; Van der Zwan 2014). Aided
by rapid increases in processing power, investment bankers began using sophisticated
computational models to devise more complex trades and trading algorithms and to
develop new, ever more exotic financial instruments for “securitizing” a wide variety of
activities. Meanwhile, new forms of intermediation have disrupted and restructured
financial markets. The rise of hedge funds and proprietary exchanges for exotic
derivative instruments, as well as the emergence of opportunities for “flash trading” in
brief, technologically-mediated windows of market advantage, has partially
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disintermediated conventional trading exchanges (Brummer 2015). At the same time,
large financial conglomerates have developed their own trading platforms and devised a
variety of other information-based strategies for (re)positioning themselves as the
intermediaries of choice (Chiu 2016). Volumes of fee-generating, cashless transactions
have skyrocketed, profiting both traditional banks and new payment intermediaries
(Levitin 2017; Servon 2017). In all of these developments, a common denominator
driving new profit strategies is privileged access to flows of information about trades and
transactions.
Similar processes of dematerialization and financialization have produced
dramatic changes in the conditions of labor. As digital communications networks have
enabled just-in-time extraction of raw materials and automated, on-demand
manufacturing and delivery, those changes have engendered new just-in-time labor
contracting and scheduling practices. In similar fashion, service economy employers rely
on forecasting algorithms and mobile communications technologies to retain, schedule,
and release workers according to varying patterns of demand (Kalleberg 2009). In the
terminology used by scholars of information-era labor practices, the proletariat has given
way to the precariat, an intermittently employed workforce that is retained and
compensated on an as-needed basis (Standing 2011). Most recently, high-profile,
platform-based “disruptors” of existing labor arrangements have emerged in a number of
service-related industries. These entities call themselves information businesses rather
than, for example, temporary employment agencies or transportation businesses, and
insist that, except for the people they hire to write their code and conduct their
government relations operations, they do not actually employ anyone. Their true
business, they argue, is disintermediation; they are simply facilitating the emergence of a
new, freelancer-driven economy that is nimbler, more cost-effective, and less impersonal.
Yet they also are reintermediators, converting the labor of user-workers (and usercustomers) into flows of monetizable data (Scholz 2017).
Of the three Polanyian factors of industrial production, land might seem the most
difficult to dematerialize. Yet land too has come to play an important role in the ongoing
dematerialization and reconstruction of industrial-era resources as modular, highly
informationalized assets. Consistent with the pattern of informationalized “innovation” in
financial markets generally, new digital information and communication technologies
have enabled the creation of new and increasingly complex derivative instruments based
on the payment streams from mortgage lending (Levitin & Wachter 2012). Although the
securitization process has slowed in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the volume of
data-driven lending and securitization that preceded (and helped precipitate) the crisis
means that, as a practical matter, significant interests in both residential and commercial
real property remain highly datafied.
The role of law in these processes typically is characterized as passive or
obstructive. Well-known narratives link each process to the disintermediation of
traditional regulatory institutions. The datafication of finance gained momentum as
financial regulators removed regulatory barriers to the movement of capital, including
both laws that prevented banks from engaging in certain kinds of speculation with the
funds entrusted to them and those that prevented cross-border speculation in nascent
global financial markets (Arrighi 1994; Krippner 2012). Similarly, both new platform-
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based work arrangements and older workforce management techniques relying on
freelance and temporary labor route around many of the protections traditionally
provided under labor and employment regimes to fulltime employees (De Stefano 2016).
The underwriters who concocted mortgage-backed securities came to view the
transaction costs imposed by local real property recording offices in the U.S. as a drag on
financial innovation, and created the Mortgage Electronic Recordation System (MERS), a
privatized registry. When a MERS member bank purchased a mortgage loan, it would
enter MERS in the local property register as the “nominee of record” and pay the
required fee just once, while MERS member banks continued to exchange the note
amongst themselves in the course of successive rounds of securitization and trading
(Levitin 2013). (In fact, the MERS system and its participants did not maintain good
internal records, a situation that has made it nearly impossible to reconstruct chains of
title for many securitized loans and the underlying real properties.)
Narratives about regulatory obstructionism and/or irrelevance are too simple,
however; law and legal institutions also have played active roles in the construction of
new datafied realities. Participants in the datafication of labor, land, and money have
mobilized legal resources, most notably contracts law, to help create both new derivative
investment instruments and new intermediation structures. Over time, some new trading
strategies have become reified as financial instruments with distinct names, contours, and
parameters; although contractual in origin, the new entities also have features that are
property-like (Cohen 2015). Similarly, ad hoc contracting practices requiring temporary
workers to disclaim many of the obligations conventionally understood as indicia of
traditional employment relationships have coalesced into regularized boilerplate
agreements. MERS, a creature of contract and corporations law, has pursued a litigation
strategy that amounts to demanding that courts bless its unusual approach to title transfer
on efficiency grounds. Practices of mortgage resale and securitization also rely on prior
acceptance of the idea of negotiability—i.e., owning debt obligations as tradable assets.
The emergence of a new, fourth dematerialized factor of production—data
extracted from people—has followed a similar path. Strategies directed toward
cultivation, harvesting, and appropriation of personal data have catalyzed sweeping
reorganizations of sociotechnical activity, and underlie the emergence of vast and
lucrative new markets organized around data collection and predictive profiling.
Participants in the personal data economy have constructed technical architectures
and business strategies that route around the obstacles posed by privacy and data
protection frameworks devised for an earlier era. Their activities both rely on and
work to constitute a different type of enabling legal framework organized around the
legal construct of a public domain: a repository of raw materials that are there for the
taking and that are framed as inputs to particular types of productive activity (Cohen
2017). As in the cases of labor, land, and money, participants in the personal data
economy also mobilize a variety of contractual tools to order their dealings with data
subjects and with each other.
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c. From Networks (and Markets) to Platforms
The processes of datafication and appropriation described in the preceding section
point toward a third dimension of the ongoing movement to informational capitalism,
which is structural and organizational. In the industrial-era economy, the locus for
activities of barter and exchange was the market, an idealized site of encounter between
buyers and sellers within which the characteristics, quantities, and prices or goods and
services were regulated autonomically by the laws of supply and demand. In the
emerging informational economy, the locus for those activities is the platform, a site of
encounter where interactions are materially and algorithmically intermediated. Vibrant
and fast-growing literatures explore the power that platforms exert over economic
exchange, social interaction, and public discourse. My goal in this section is the more
modest one of teasing out the connections between platform logics and the emergent
design of legal institutions for information property. As the perceived imperatives of
access to data and to data processing capacity have sharpened, the platform has emerged
as a key site of appropriation, and platform-driven cycles of dis- and re- intermediation
have emerged as a recurring motif in information-economy narratives about competition,
innovation, and access.
Over the past several decades, scholars in a wide variety of fields have identified
networks and infrastructures as important organizing concepts for studying the
information economy. A network is a mode of organization in which hubs and nodes
structure the flows of transactions and interactions. Network organization is not a unique
property of digital information and communications networks; rather, as network
scientists have shown, such networks simply make visible a latent characteristic of the
many human activities that rely on communication and interconnection (Barabasi 2002).
Digital information and communications networks do, however, reduce many of the costs
and lag times formerly associated with such activities. In addition, participants in
networks reap generalized benefits, or network externalities (Katz & Shapiro 1994), as
those networks grow in size and scale, and the relatively low costs of digital
interconnection have enabled digital networks to become very large. Infrastructures are
shared resources that facilitate downstream production of other goods (Frischmann
2012). Roads and electric power grids, for example, play essential roles as inputs into a
variety of downstream goods, as do less tangible resources like linguistic and scientific
conventions. Notably, infrastructures may be managed as commons but need not be:
some infrastructures, such as the interbank wire transfer system, are club goods financed
and controlled by their members; others, such as local electric power suppliers, are
managed as utilities and financed based on metered consumption charges; and still others,
including facilities for Internet access in most countries, are privately provided but
subject to various regulatory obligations. Digital information and communications
technologies function both as infrastructures and as networks. As scholars in fields
ranging from industrial organization (Smith-Doerr & Powell 2005) to geography (Sassen
2002) to media and communications studies (Gillespie 2010; Van Dijck 2013) have
shown, the forms of connectivity they provide have reshaped seemingly every area of
human activity.
In some discussions of the information economy, the terms “network,”
“infrastructure,” and “platform” are used interchangeably, but platforms are not the same
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as networks, nor are they simply infrastructures (cf. Plantin, et al. 2016). The intertwined
functions that platforms provide—intermediation between would-be counterparties and
legibility of users—have important antecedents in twentieth-century direct marketing and
advertising practices. In the late 1980’s, as proprietary infrastructures for radio and
television broadcast began to give way to a far more complex media ecosystem, the
proliferation of cable channels and home video recording technologies initially caused an
existential crisis for advertisers, whose aggregate measures of audience tastes began to
dissolve into seemingly unmanageable fragments (Ang 1991, pp. 68-77). That
fragmentation, however, also lent momentum to emerging practices of targeted
marketing. At the same time, the opening of digital communications networks for
commercial exploitation engendered the development of new, highly granular techniques
for measuring audiences and predicting audience appeal (Bouk 2017; Turow 1997). The
melding of digital architectures and commercial pressures for legibility produced a
striking inversion. Twentieth-century mass-media intermediaries had purchased market
research as a standalone service from third-party providers, but as legibility assumed
increasing normative force as overarching frames for commercial endeavor, the legibility
function began to burrow into the core of the infrastructure itself. A world with a vast
diversity of information sources required intermediation, and legibility became the
essential function for an intermediary to provide.
Platforms represent infrastructure-based strategies for introducing friction into
networks. They are information-era formations in two distinct senses: they pursue profit
strategies that revolve around information and information processing, and those
strategies both rely on and reinforce the centrality of a particular set of sociotechnical
predicate conditions involving networked, mediated, digital communication (Helmond
2015; Srnicek 2017). Platforms operate with the goal of making clusters of transactions
and relationships stickier—sticky enough to adhere to the platform despite participants’
theoretical ability to exit and look elsewhere for other intermediation options. To
accomplish that goal, platforms must provide services that participants view as desirable
and empowering, thereby generating and enabling participants to leverage network
externalities. But they also must thwart certain other kinds of networking by developing
and policing their own protocols for access. The latter power is one that the fictionalized
construct of the market lacked, and it comprehensively reshapes the conditions of
economic exchange.
The exchanges constituted by platforms are two- or multi-sided: they serve
buyers, the sellers seeking to reach them, and often advertisers seeking the buyers’
attention. Because the platform forms relationships with members of each group
separately, it can define the terms of each relationship differently (Rochet & Tirole
2006). So, for example, it can charge little or nothing to participants on one side of a
target market and make its profit on another side. A dominant platform can reduce prices
to one group—for example, book buyers or consumers of professional networking
services—below marginal cost and still maintain its dominance by charging fees to some
other group, and a provider of free services to consumers can attain and maintain
dominance by controlling access to the “market for eyeballs.”
From the perspective of users, a group that for purposes of this analysis includes
individuals but also advertisers and niche platforms, dominant platforms in particular
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function in a manner analogous to utilities, supplying basic information services now
deemed essential to a wide variety of economic and social activities. Users therefore may
experience platform services as both empowering and generative (Gillespie 2010). At the
same time, users typically know very little about the way the intermediation provided by
the platform actually works.
From the perspective of the platform, its business model instantiates both
horizontal and vertical strategies for extracting the surplus value of user data. Because
that goal requires large numbers of users generating large amounts of data, the platform
provider’s goal is to become and remain the indispensable point of intermediation for
parties in its target markets (Srnicek 2017). Platforms use a variety of strategies to attain
commercial success and pursue commercial dominance, including co-branding,
preferential placement, and interplatform affiliation. Because the principal worry for any
platform is disintermediation by a would-be competitor, however, the root strategies for
competitive positioning involve preserving privileged access to data and algorithms.
3. Emergent Formations of Information Property: Two Stories
In this final section of the chapter, I examine two emergent formations of
information property that exist in growing tension with one another: the movement
toward appropriation and enclosure of data as an economic resource and the
countermovement toward construction of information commons within which
appropriation and enclosure are prohibited. This exercise suggests some additional
insights into the processes by which new institutions for information property first begin
to take shape and the conditions that they require to flourish. In each case, new
institutions for information property emerge via routine, strategic interactions between
interested parties—i.e., via processes that are fundamentally performative. Parties to
these interactions rely heavily on a different legal institution—contract—to define and
formalize terms and conditions through which tropes of appropriation, enclosure, and
secrecy are iterated and reiterated. Put differently, they are intellectual property
entrepreneurs, seeking to define, propagate, and destabilize particular types of
arrangements. The success or failure of these strategies depends to some extent on the
content of the terms, but far more on other, contextual factors.
a. Platform-Based Property Strategies for Data
Platform-based competitive strategies revolve fundamentally around control of
access in two different and complementary senses. Platform users seek access to the
essential social, commercial, and cultural connectivity that platforms provide, while
platform providers seek access to the data necessary to create and sustain competitive
advantage in their chosen field(s) of intermediation. The result is a bargain that appears
relatively straightforward—access for data—but that in reality is complex and
importantly generative. One important byproduct of these access-for-data arrangements is
a quiet revolution in the legal status of data as (de facto if not de jure) proprietary
informational property.
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We have already seen that platform- and contract-based strategies have played a
pivotal role in the dematerialization of land, labor, and money and their reconstitution as
data. Platforms use contracts systematically to facilitate and protect their own legibility
function, extracting transparency from users but shielding basic operational knowledge
from third-party vendors, users, and advertisers alike.
The particular form of the access-for-data contract—a boilerplate terms-of-use
agreement not open to negotiation—asserts a correspondingly nonnegotiable authority
over the conditions of access that operates in the background of even the most generative
information-economy service. Boilerplate agreements are contractual in form but
mandatory in operation, and so are a powerful tool both for private ordering of behavior
and for private reordering of even the most bedrock legal rights and obligations (Radin
2013). Through the terms-of-use agreement, the platform asserts “control over the surface
on which the exchange takes place” (Andersson Schwarz [date], p. __). The contracts
themselves, of course, are “only words”—and, for that matter, words that most users do
not read—but they gain powerful normative force from both their continual assertion and
reassertion and their propagation within environments that use technical protocols to
define the parameters of permitted behavior. The combination of asserted contractual
control and technical control becomes the vehicle through which the platform imposes its
own logics on the encounters that it mediates.
Commenting on the legal arrangements used to effectuate the dematerialization of
labor in the informational economy, Martin Kenney and John Zysman (2016) analogize
the model to the “putting out” of prefabricated pieces for assembly that occurred early in
the industrial era. As anyone who has ever assembled a piece of prefabricated furniture or
a modular closet system knows, piecework makes certain types of goods more widely
accessible, but it is also tyrannical as to form; its component parts are intended to be
assembled only in particular, predetermined ways. Boilerplate access-for-labor
instruments, consumer finance contracts, and others work in tandem with platform
protocols to configure land, labor, and money as modular inputs to the intermediary’s
profit model.
From an intellectual property perspective, the terms-of-use agreements crafted by
platforms and other information intermediaries function as points of entry for institutional
entrepreneurship targeting the form and substance of legal entitlements in information. In
a process that is fundamentally performative, the terms-of-use agreement steps in where
the map of formal legal entitlements ends, providing a vehicle for leveraging trade
secrecy entitlements into de facto property arrangements operative against large numbers
of people with no direct relationship with the platform owner. In dealings with
commercial counterparties, successful platforms jealously guard access to both data
collected from users and the algorithms used to process the data, offering advertisers
placement but never direct access to the data or algorithms themselves, offering
developers access to carefully curated data sets, data structures and programming
interfaces (Helmond 2015), and vigilantly policing automated crawling and data
extraction by would-be competitors.
Notably, traditional intellectual property rights play helpful but secondary roles in
this process of de facto propertization, functioning as sources of leverage that can be
invoked to channel would-be users toward entering the access-for-data bargain on the
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platform’s terms and/or to prevent would-be competitors from gaining access to
information stored on the platform by other means. For example, access to a branded
exchange may enable third-party vendors to position their products and services as more
desirable to consumers. When access to a platform requires technical interoperability—as
is the case, for example, with apps for desktop and mobile operating systems—patents
and copyrights can supply important points of leverage against unauthorized access by
third-party vendors and would-be platform competitors. As the example of Google
shows, however, not all platform businesses consider copyrights a necessary tool for
limiting access.
In sum, the access-for-data arrangement is both a concrete bargain and a complex
act of institutional entrepreneurship, with a number of interrelated implications for the
intellectual property system that are still playing out. In addition to their other roles,
platforms are in an important sense intellectual property entrepreneurs, working to refine
and propagate appropriation strategies that serve their economic interests.
b. Commons vs./and/as Property Institutions
The shift to an informational economy also has catalyzed a vibrant movement for
informational commons. Formally, the label “commons” denotes an institution for
resource management that is structured around nondiscriminatory sharing among the
community of members (Frischmann 2012). Many different types of resources may be
managed as commons, but the low costs of producing many types of information goods
and distributing them via digital communications networks make possible new types of
commons-based production arrangements as well (Benkler 2006). For many, the
emergence of networked information and communication technologies seemed to
promise a wholly new era in which cultural production by decentralized communities of
peers would largely displace cultural production by the copyright industries. So far,
however, although some commons movements have become well established (Creative
Commons 2017; Thakker, et al. 2017), the full extent of that promise has yet to be
realized.
The relationship between commons and property-based notions of exclusivity is
complex and underexplored. According to one well-known definition, commons are the
opposite of property in the sense that “no single person has exclusive control over the use
and disposition of any particular resource in the commons” (Benkler 2006, p. 61). That
formulation is compelling but also somewhat misleading. Commons is the opposite of
exclusivity in the sole-ownership sense, but both arrangements are types of property
institutions. Notably, institutions organized as commons may exclude nonmembers from
resource access and use, and may invoke notions of property to sanction and even
exclude entirely those who attempt to benefit from access without accepting the
accompanying obligations.
Institutions for commons-based resource management persist over time only if their
rules effectively govern members’ behavior and prevent defection. For this reason, most
successful examples outside the informational context involve localized resources
managed by small, well-defined groups (Ostrom 1990). Within the networked digital
environment, however, the same conditions that enable distributed production of
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information goods also have enabled the construction of distributed institutions for
commons-based management using legal instruments designed to help the terms and
conditions spread virally. The two most prominent examples are the free/libre open
source licensing system (F/LOSS) and Creative Commons, both self-consciously framed
as efforts to develop sustainable, “copyleft” alternatives to existing copyright-based
institutions. As in the case of platform-based propertization strategies, legal instruments
for distributed commons-based management take the form of boilerplate restrictions that
are contractual in form but mandatory in operation. As developed and pioneered by the
open source software movement, this strategy was self-consciously mimetic; it relies on
constructs of authorial control and take-it-or-leave-it licensing, and when challenged in
court it has necessitated similar arguments about enforceability. For exactly those
reasons, it has occasioned soul-searching among advocates for information commons
(e.g., Dusollier 2006).
Thoughtful design and effective reiteration of narratives about boilerplate
enforceability, however, are not the only determinants of success; materiality and
economic organization also matter. Within both technical and cultural communities,
powerful constituencies have resisted the viral spread of information commons. In the
open source licensing context, persistent, thorny issues surround the interfaces between
open source and proprietary systems and modules. Open-source communities have
wrestled publicly with questions about how far proprietary incorporation of open
modules should be allowed to proceed before triggering viral licensing provisions. In the
cultural context, dominant producers of popular culture for the most part do not wish to
relinquish control over their products to the full extent demanded even by the most
protective versions of the Creative Commons license. Because cultural network effects
are weaker than coded interoperability protocols, the Creative Commons model has been
incapable of compelling viral spread in the same manner and to the same extent as the
open source licensing model has done.
Both the open source licensing movement and the Creative Commons movement
also confront other ongoing challenges rooted in the material logics of the platform-based
economy. As discussed previously, although networked digital communications
infrastructures do enable distributed peer production, they also are highly configurable.
Therefore, they have proved well-suited to strategies of reorganization, appropriation,
and enclosure by platform-based business models. The shift toward platform-based
organizational logics has implications for both technical and cultural production. Most
obviously, platform logics facilitate efforts to control flows of proprietary cultural
content; for example, dedicated platforms like Netflix or Hulu need not carry Creative
Commons content, and zero-rating initiatives by access providers can effectively
deprioritize such content. Open source software has attained a more durable foothold, but
access-control strategies based on patenting, on copyright control of application
programming interfaces, and on digital rights management tend to be implemented in
ways that are incompatible with the open source ethos. Platform logics also have
implications for new initiatives based on open content and/or data; such efforts
sometimes have found themselves confronting appropriation and enclosure after taking
root in user communities (Pessach 2016).
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A final set of complications confronting movements for information commons is
political, and flows from the fact that commons and users’ rights are not equivalent. As
noted above, institutions designed as commons do not inevitably afford their members
open-ended grants of users’ rights. This is easiest to see in the case of commons that are
constituted for the benefit of particular, well-defined groups, such as the grazing and
water rights collectives studied by Ostrom (1990). In such institutions, the parameters of
permitted access and use are strictly defined. Even in more widely dispersed commons
regimes, however, users may not ignore the rules established by the governing
institutions for those regimes. For example, someone who wants to violate the rules of an
open source license will not be able to rely on his or her license for permission, but will
need to mount a challenge based on the background copyright law. Users’ rights,
meanwhile, generally are conceptualized as limited exceptions for personal private use
that must be claimed on a case by case basis, rather than as common privileges
automatically available to all.
These differences between commons and users’ rights have created both political
fragmentation and moral hazard. Movements organized around users’ rights, and
particularly around peer-to-peer file-sharing and open entertainment platforms, have
struggled to earn the approval of courts and policymakers. Many such movements now
are explicitly framed as counter-movements in a way that many of the most high-profile
and successful commons movements are not. Meanwhile, the copyleft movements’
deliberate reliance on the anti-radical rhetorics of authorial choice (in the case of Creative
Commons) and business-friendly utility (in the case of some, though not all, open source
communities) have been important factors enabling them to take root and flourish. The
result is that users’ rights groups and commons movements do not always speak with a
unified voice in copyright reform debates, a situation that has made the most lasting
reforms advocated by both groups more difficult to achieve.
V. Conclusion
Information property institutions are not neutral tools for welfare maximization, as
many economists and economically-inclined legal scholars would have it, nor are they
simply instrumentalities of hegemonic control, to paraphrase an oft-repeated refrain in
media studies and critical legal studies. They play central roles in the evolving
articulation of informational capitalism as a system of political economy, and in so doing
they shape the evolution of both media content and media infrastructures. At the same
time, however, the evolution of informational capitalism calls forth new propertization
strategies and channels those strategies in particular ways. The examples of appropriated
data flows and information commons illustrate two very different paths that process has
taken.
References
Andersson Schwarz, Jonas. [2016]. “Platform Logic: The Need for an Interdisciplinary Approach
to the Platform Economy.” [working paper; need placement info].
Ang, Ien. 1991. Desperately Seeking the Audience. New York: Routledge.

Cohen, Property and the Information Economy, v.2 (June 22, 17)| 17

Arrighi, Giovanni. 1994. The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our
Times. New York: Verso.
Barabasi, Albert-Laszlo. 2002. Linked: The New Science of Networks. Cambridge, Mass.: Perseus
Publishing.
Beebe, Barton. 2010. “Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code,” Harvard Law Review
123(4): 809-889.
Benkler, Yochai. 1999. “Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on the
Enclosure of the Public Domain.” New York University Law Review 74(2): 354-446 (1999).
Benkler, Yochai. 2002. “Intellectual Property and the Organization of Information Production.”
International Review of Law and Economics 22(1): 81-107.
Benkler, Yochai. 2006. The Wealth of Networks. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Bettig, Ronald V. 1996. Copyrighting Culture: The Political Economy of Intellectual Property.
Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
Boczkowski, Pablo J. & Siles, Ignacio. 2014. “Steps Toward Cosmopolitanism in the Study of
Media Technologies: Integrating Scholarship on Production, Consumption, Materiality,
and Content,” in Tarleton Gillespie, Pablo J. Boczkowski, & Kirsten A. Foot, eds., Media
Technologies, Essays on Communication, Materiality, and Society, pp. 53-76. Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press.
Bouk, Dan. [2017 forthcoming]. “The History and Political Economy of Personal Data over the
Last Two Centuries in Three Acts.” Osiris ___(_):_____.
Boyle, James A. 1998. Shamans, Software, and Spleens: Law and the Construction of the
Information Society. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Brummer, Chris. 2015. “Disruptive Technology and Securities Regulation.” Fordham Law
Review 84(3): 977-1052.
Burk, Dan L. 2016. “On the Sociology of Patenting,” Minnesota Law Review 101(2): 421-452.
Castells, Manuel. 1996. The Rise of the Network Society. New York: Wiley-Blackwell.
Chiu, Iris H.-Y. 2016. “Fintech and Disruptive Business Models in Financial Products,
Intermediation and Markets: Policy Implications for Financial Regulators.” Journal of
Technology Law and Policy 21(1): 55-112.
Chon, Margaret. 2006. “Intellectual Property and the Development Divide,” Cardozo Law Review
95(2): 2821-2912.
Cohen, Julie E. 2012. Configuring the Networked Self: Law, Code, and the Play of Everyday
Practice. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Cohen, Julie E. 2015. “Property as Institutions for Resources: Lessons from and for IP,” Texas
Law Review 94(1): 1-57.
Cohen, Julie E. 2017. “The Biopolitical Public Domain: The Legal Construction of Informational
Capitalism,” Philosophy and Technology; http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13347-017-0258-2
Cohen, Julie E. [forthcoming]. Between Truth and Power: The Legal Construction of
Informational Capitalism. New York: Oxford University Press.
Coleman, E. Gabriella. 2013. Coding Freedom: The Ethics and Aesthetics of Hacking. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.

Cohen, Property and the Information Economy, v.2 (June 22, 17)| 18

Coombe, Rosemary. 1998. The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties: Authorship,
Appropriation, and Law. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.
Creative Commons. 2017. “State of the Commons 2016,” https://stateof.creativecommons.org/.
De Stefano, Valerio. 2016. “The Rise of the ‘Just-in-Time’ Workforce: On-Demand Work,
Crowdwork, and Labor Protection in the ‘Gig-Economy,’” Comparative Labor Law and
Policy Journal 37(_): 471-504.
Desai, Deven R. 2012. “From Trademarks to Brands.” Florida Law Review 64(4); 981-1044.
Dusollier, Severine. 2006. “The Master’s Tools v. the Master’s House: Creative Commons v.
Copyright,” Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts 29(3): 101-123.
Epstein, Richard. 2011. “What Is So Special About Intellectual Property? The Case for Intelligent
Carryovers,” in Geoffrey D. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, eds., Competition Policy and
Patent Law Under Uncertainy: Regulating Innovation, pp. 42-74. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Fennell, Lee Anne. 2013. “The Problem of Resource Access,” Harvard Law Review 126: 14711531.
Frischmann, Brett M. 2012. Infrastructure: The Social Value of Shared Resources. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Frischmann, Brett M. & Mark A. Lemley. 2007. “Spillovers,” Columbia Law Review 107(1):
257-302.
Frischmann, Brett M., Madison, Michael J., and Strandburg, Katherine J. 2014. Governing
Knowledge Commons. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gillespie, Tarleton. 2007. Wired Shut: Copyright and the Shape of Digital Culture. Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press.
Gillespie, Tarleton. 2010. “The Politics of ‘Platforms,’” New Media & Society 12(3): 347-364.
Gordon, Wendy J. “A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the
Natural Law of Intellectual Property.” Yale Law Journal 102(7): 1533-1609.
Gray, Jonathan, Sandvoss, Cornel, & Harrington, C. Lee. 2007. Fandom: Identities and
Communities in a Mediated World. New York: New York University Press.
Helmond, Anne. 2015. “The Platformization of the Web: Making Web Data Platform Ready,”
Social Media and Society, doi: 10.1177/2056305115603080.
Herman, Bill D. 2013. The Fight Over Digital Rights: The Politics of Copyright and Technology.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Holt, Douglas B. 2004. How Brands Become Icons: The Principles of Cultural Branding.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press.
Jaszi, Peter. 1994. “On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity,” in
Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi, eds., The Construction of Authorship: Textual
Approaches in Law and Literature, pp. 29-56. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.
Kalleberg, Arne L. 2009. “Precarious Work, Insecure Workers: Employment Relations in
Transition,” American Sociological Review 74(Feb.): 1-22.
Katz, Michael L. & Carl Shapiro. 1994. “Systems Competition and Network Effects.” Journal of
Economic Perspectives 8(2): 93-115.

Cohen, Property and the Information Economy, v.2 (June 22, 17)| 19

Kelty, Christopher M. 2008. Two Bits: The Cultural Significance of Free Software. Durham,
N.C.: Duke University Press.
Kenney, Martin & Zysman, John. 2016. “The Rise of the Platform Economy.” Issues in Science
and Technology 32(3): 61.
Krippner, Greta. 2012. Capitalizing on Crisis: The Political Origins of the Rise of Finance.
Harvard: Harvard University Press.
Landes, William M. & Posner, Richard A. 2003. The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property
Law. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Lessig, Lawrence. 1998. Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace. New York: Basic Books.
Levitin, Adam J. 2013. “The Paper Chase: Securitization, Foreclosure, and the Uncertainty of
Mortgage Title.” Duke Law Journal 63(3): 637-734.
Levitin, Adam J. [2017 forthcoming]. “Pandora’s Digital Box: The Promise and Perils of Digital
Wallets,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 166(_): _____.
Levitin, Adam J. & Wachter, Susan M. 2012. “Explaining the Housing Bubble.” Georgetown
Law Journal 100(4): 1177-1258.
Lievrouw, Leah A. 2014. “Materiality and Media in Communication and Technology Studies: An
Unfinished Project,” in Gillespie, et al., eds., Media Technologies 21-52.
Litman, Jessica. 1989. “Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History.” Oregon Law Review
68(2): 275-362.
Litman, Jessica. 2001. Digital Copyright. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
McDonagh, Luke. 2015. “From Brand Performance to Consumer Performativity: Assessing
European Trademark Law After the Rise of Anthropological Marketing,” Journal of Law
and Society 42(4): 611-638.
McKenna, Mark P. 2007. “The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law,” Notre Dame Law
Review 82(5): 225-294.
Merges, Robert P. 2000. “One Hundred Years of Solicitude” Intellectual Property Law, 1900 2000.” California Law Review 88(6): 2187-2240.
Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective
Action. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Parchomovsky, Gideon & Wagner, R. Polk. 2005. “Patent Portfolios.” University of Pennsylvania
Law Review 154(1): 1-78.
Pessach, Guy. 2016. “Beyond IP—The Cost of Free: Informational Capitalism in a Post IP Era,”
Osgoode Hall Law Review 54(1): 225-251.
Plantin, Jean-Christophe, Lagoze, Carl, Edwards, Paul N., & Sandvig, Christian. 2016.
“Infrastructure Studies Meet Platform Studies in the Age of Google and Facebook.” New
Media and Society, doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444816661553

Polanyi, Karl. 1957. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our
Time. Boston: Beacon Press.
Radin, Margaret Jane. 2013. Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and the Rule of Law.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Rochet, Jean-Charles & Tirole, Jean. 2006. “Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report.” RAND
Journal of Economics 37(3): 645-667.
Sassen, Saskia, ed. 2002. Global Networks, Linked Cities. New York: Routledge.

Cohen, Property and the Information Economy, v.2 (June 22, 17)| 20

Schiller, Dan. 2007. How to Think About Information. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Scholz, Trebor. 2017. Uberworked and Underpaid: How Workers Are Disrupting the Digital
Economy. New York: Polity Press.
Schur, Richard D. 2009. Parodies of Ownership: Hip-Hop Aesthetics and Intellectual Property
Law. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Servon, Lisa. 2017. The Unbanking of America: How the Middle Class Survives. New York:
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
Silbey, Jessica. 2015. The Eureka Myth: Authors, Innovators, and Everyday Intellectual Property.
Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Singer, Joseph. 2011. “Property Law as the Infrastructure of Democracy,” in Michael Allen Wolf,
ed., Powell on Real Property, pp. 11-1 to 11-17. New Providence, NJ: Lexis-Nexis
Publishing.
Smith, Henry E. 2007. “Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in
Information.” Yale Law Journal 116(_): 1742-1822.
Smith-Doerr, Laurel & Powell, Walter W. 2005. “Networks and Economic Life.” In Neil J.
Smelser & Richard Swedberg, eds., The Handbook of Economic Sociology, 2d ed., pp.
379-401. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Srnicek, Nick. 2017. Platform Capitalism. Malden, Mass.: Polity Press.
Standing, Guy. 2011. The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class. London: Bloomsbury.
Thakker, Dharmesh, Schireson, Max, & Nguyen-Ha, Dan. 2017. “Tracking the Explosive Growth
of
Open-Source
Software,”
TechCrunch,
Apr.
17,
2017,
https://techcrunch.com/2017/04/07/tracking-the-explosive-growth-of-open-sourcesoftware/.
Turow, Joseph. 1997. Breaking Up America: Advertisers and the New Media World. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Tushnet, Rebecca. 2015. “Stolen Valor and Stolen Luxury: Free Speech and Exclusivity.” In
Haochen Sun, Barton Beebe, and Madhavi Sunder, eds., The Luxury Economy and
Intellectual Property: Critical Reflections, pp. 121-143. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Van der Zwan, Natascha. 2014. “Making Sense of Financialization.” Socio-Economic Review 12:
99-129.
Van Dijck, Jose. 2013. The Culture of Connectivity: A Critical History of Social Media. New
York: Oxford University Press.

